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Preliminary Thoughts on the Problem of Mortality 
Robert L. Latta 
(Abstract) 
By "the problem of mortality," I mean human concern about the fact of mortal-
ity: the fact that every human being dies within a limited time from birth. This 
concern generates a host of interesting philosophical questions, many of them 
very difficult. Below, I consider a few of these questions in a preliminary, unsys-
tematic, and to a considerable extent speculative way. It is possible that contra-
dictions lurk among my answers. If so, they represent a task for a later time-if 
there is one! 
Keywords philosophy, metaphysics, mortality, 
QUESTION 1: With respect to mortality, what is it that I wish I could believe? 
It would satisfy me, and I daresay it would satisfy many others, to know that this life of 
mine is unlimited in the sense that it will last as long as I want it to last, barring a cata-
strophic accident, and will take me into fascinating new domains and become more and 
more enjoyable. 
QUESTION 2: I feel that my life is short, even if I should live well into my nineties. But 
why do I feel so? 
I am not merely a subject of experience, a receiver of inputs. I am an agent, too. a pro-
ducer of outputs. Some people. perhaps, want to live longer than they will not primarily 
in order to continue enjoying experience, but rather in order to complete various projects 
they consider important. 
Setting aside the question of agency, however. I feel that my life is short because I for-
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get almost everything that I have experienced since I began to experience, well before I 
was born. Because I forget, I fail to recognize that my life is very long indeed in subjec-
tive terms- long beyond imagination. 
QUESTION 3: Is death to be feared? If not, this ought considerably to alleviate concern 
about mortality. 
To begin with, a desire to live eternally is one thing, a desire to live for a very long time, 
so long that one need not worry about the end, is another, and a desire to live indefinitely 
long, as long as one chooses, is yet another. Of these three desires, I take the third to be 
the most rationaL 
Strictly speaking, the fact that a human being must die, as things stand, within one 
hundred years or so is not fate. Rather, it reflects the limits of present· day technology. 
Nevertheless, it is as if it were stern fate imposed from above. The desire to live indefi-
nitely long is a desire to be free of this fate. 
Clearly, it is possible to distinguish the desire to live indefinitely long from the fear of 
death. One might desire to live indefinitely long and yet feel no fear of death. In this case, 
death is merely regrettable. On the other hand, one might have no desire to live longer 
and yet fear death. "Tired '0 1ivin' an' scared '0 dyin,'" as the lyrics have it. 
It stands to reason that the fear of death -fear of the process of dying and the state of 
death indiscriminately-is at bottom an outcome of the process of organic evolution. Its 
survival value is obvious. It is not to be expected, then, that it is entirely rationaL 
In order to think accurately, however, it is necessary to distinguish the process of dy-
ing-that is, rapidly, near the end of one's life-from the state of death. The process of 
dying is part of life. As long as one is dying, one is still alive and has not yet arrived at 
the state of death. 
In principle, one might fear the process of dying but not the state of death, or the state 
of death but not the process of dying. It is possible, then, to distinguish fear of the one 
from fear of the other. As for fear of the process of dying, perhaps it comes down largely 
to fear of pain and fear of that which one has not yet experienced. As for fear of pain, 
unless there is concrete reason to believe that the process of dying will prove excruciat· 
ing, it is irrational to suppose that it will. If it is pain that you fear, then you ought to 
fear living, not dying. 
As for fear of that which one has not yet experienced, viz., the process of dying, when 
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one dies it is for the first time-though there are traditions that deny this-and every hu-
man death is to a certain extent unique. One cannot know, then, exactly what to expect. 
But this does not make the process of dying unique. There is a first time for everything, 
as the saying has it. The preferred attitude, surely, is pleasurable anticipation at the 
prospect of something new and different, even if it is the very last thing. 
I will say nothing further about the process of dying. 
As for fear of the state of death, it is augmented by images. There is, above all, the im-
age of eternal darkness. It is natural to imagine that everyday consciousness yields to 
darkness at the time of death. It ought to be obvious, however, that the state of death is 
not a matter of darkness, whether temporary or eternal. The experience of darkness is 
an experience like any other, and hence implies that the brain continues to function. But 
the brain, of course, does not continue to function. It does not even continue to exist. 
There is no darkness, and this fact is of fundamental importance, for it means that the 
state of death is not fearful. 
The reasoning of those who imagine that everyday consciousness yields to eternal 
darkness at the time of death appears to run as follows: After the body ceases to func-
tion, and with it the brain, there is no input into the system. Hence there is an 
information-free state of idling, as it were. This state is one of darkness. It is like the 
steady hum of a radio that is receiving no signal at the moment. Clearly, however, there 
is no information-free state of idling in the case of death. If you want to imagine the 
state of death accurately in terms of the simile of the radio, do not imagine a steady 
blank hum. Rather, imagine that there is no radio. There is no radio and hence no blank 
hum, and similarly there is no brain and hence no darkness. 
It is necessary, then, to distinguish the notion that everything turns dark for me at my 
death, which is clearly false, from the thesis that my consciousness comes to an end, 
which might be true. 
I conclude, then, that the state of death is not to be feared-though it is perhaps to be 
avoided, given that one's survival poses no great problem for others, as long as one en-
joys life or has important projects to complete or important duties to fulfill. 
QUESTION 4: What is the most accurate and adequate image of death? 
The most popular image of death is, perhaps, that of a skeleton or a skull-in essence, a 
nonfunctioning human body, This is not, however, an accurate image. To form a more 
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accurate image, imagine a space, a room in a house, for instance, in which there is no 
body at all. There might, however, be a more adequate image. 
QUESTION 5: What is consciousness? 
I maintain that consciousness consists in neural activity, or more generally physical ac-
tivity, of certain descriptions. This is classical physicalism with respect to consciousness, 
and it calls, of course, for explanation. Here, then, is my explanation in a nutshell: A hu-
man being is in a position to register the neural activity that constitutes his own con-
sciousness in that it occurs in his brain as an ordinary operation of the brain. The crucial 
point is that he registers that neural activity itself as opposed to information about it or 
a neural representation of it, but does not perceive it in any way. In consequence, he con-
ceives of it not as neural activity, but rather as experience-as a pain, a tickle, a thought, 
or whatever else it might be. The neuroscientist at the screen of a brain monitor, in con-
trast, perceives that same neural activity but does not register it, and in consequence con-
ceives of it quite differently-viz., as neural activity. 
QUESTION 6: What is a human being? 
I maintain that a human being is a functioning body of a certain type. This, too, is classi-
cal physicalism. The notion that there is more to a human being, viz., a soul or a mental 
life, is, I think, the upshot of confusion. A human being does indeed have a mental life, 
but that mental life is not something over and above the functioning body, for it consists 
in neural activity in the brain. That neural activity is indeed something other than neural 
activity for the subject himself, for, as explained just above, he conceives of it as experi-
ence in that he registers but does not perceive it. The subject in the case, then, is a func-
tioning human body, and there is no reason to conclude that a human being is a mysteri-
ous mental particular, a soul. 
QUESTION 7: Does it make sense to attempt to achieve immortality through biotechnol-
ogy? 
Strictly speaking, that which is in question here is not immortality, but rather an end to 
the aging process. 
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The primitive desire to avoid death is very powerful and the biotechnological means to 
eliminate the aging process may well be in hand before the end of the present century. 
The consequences of making use of those means, however, are frightening. To mention 
just a few of the more obvious difficulties: What will become of the environment when 
no one dies except by accident or deliberate killing? In particular, how will it be possible 
to feed a grossly overpopulated planet? What forms of political organization will arise in 
response to environmental collapse? Or is childbearing to be outlawed? In that case, who 
will show innovation when almost everyone alive is three or four hundred years old? And 
so on. This prospect lends considerable urgency to the problem of mortality. 
It may well be, moreover, that to a full, accurate view, we already have what we de· 
sire with respect to mortality. It is far from clear, then, that it makes sense to attempt to 
achieve immortality through biotechnology. 
QUESTION 8: A human being is a physical object, a subject of experience, an agent, and 
a member of society, among other things. In the context of the problem of mortality, as 
opposed to a practical context in which the task is to assign responsibility, allot rewards, 
correct bad behavior, and so on, what makes a human being the particular subject of ex· 
perience he or she is? 
I would say that the configuration of the functioning body, including, of course, the brain, 
down to the molecular level (or the sub· atomic level, if you wish), is the appropriate cri· 
terion. It is this, I think, that makes a particular human being the subject of experience 
he or she is. 
This, however, carries startling consequences. If a human being who lives several cen· 
turies after you comes to have precisely the same configuration you had at a certain time, 
then he or she is you. But the same holds for a contemporary. In principle, you might be 
where you are now, and simultaneously on the other side of the planet. It appears to fol· 
low, moreover, that subject identity is a matter of degree: a human being who has almost 
the same configuration as you is you to a great extent whereas one who has a configura-
tion very different from yours, as human variation goes, is you to only a slight extent. 
Any human being who lives at any time is you to one extent or another. The same holds, 
moreover, for any conscious being that lives-or functions, if it cannot be said to live-at 
any time. 
Tentatively, I accept these consequences. That is to say, I do not take them to consti· 
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tute a reductio ad absurdum of the similarity criterion of subject identity. 
A question arises: Suppose that A and B are precisely similar functioning human bod-
ies. Are they merely qualitatively identical, or are they numerically identical? Perhaps 
there is no choice but to say that they are merely qualitatively identical, since there are, 
after all, two of them. On the other hand, there is no reason to treat the one differently 
than the other, and if B lives after A, it does appear reasonable to say that B is simply A 
again-that is, that B is numerically identical to A. It will be necessary to resolve this 
difficulty. 
QUESTION 9: Is it possible in principle that an experience might occur that is not the 
experience of any subject? If so, this might encourage a deflationary account of the sub-
ject. 
I maintain that any given experience is numerically identical to a certain neural or physi· 
cal event-viz., the neural or physical correlate, to speak dualistically. This thesis is of 
course highly controversial, but, for lack of space, I shall not offer any argument for it 
here beyond the suggestion that the subject registers the neural event itself but does not 
perceive it in any way and in consequence conceives of it not as a neural event but as an 
experience. Let us assume, then, that any given experience is indeed numerically identi· 
cal to its physical correlate and perform a thought experiment. 
A) Imagine a neural event that constitutes an everyday human experience-a whiff of 
rose, for instance. It is a physical event in the subject's brain. Now try to imagine a sec-
ond physical event just like the first in all essential respects, which, however, occurs not 
in a brain, but rather in the void - in the middle of a room, for instance. The Question is 
this: Is it possible to imagine such a thing, and if so, does the second event likewise con· 
stitute a whiff of rose? 
Answer: I think that the answer is yes on both counts. As for the second count, if a 
physical event of a certain configuration constitutes an experience of a certain type in 
virtue of that configuration, then it constitutes an experience of that type whether it oc-
curs in a brain, in the void, or elsewhere. 
If this is correct, it entails that it is indeed possible, in principle, that an experience 
might occur that is not the experience of any subject, a subjectless experience. Most phi-
losophers deny this, but on inadequate grounds. 
If a subjectless experience is positive, that is, enjoyable, then, presumably, it is of posi· 
122-
tive intrinsic value, or intrinsic value for short, for all that no subject is in a position to 
intuit its value. If it is a whiff of rose, then, for any given subject, it is like a whiff of 
rose that another subject enjoys. 
QUESTION 10: Subjects of equal complexity and sophistication are, perhaps, like identi-
cal milk bottles: it does not matter which bottle holds the milk, and it does not matter 
what subject has the positive experience. Is this correct? 
I think that it is correct. The subject is not to the point. That is to say, the significant 
circumstance is that a positive experience occurs, and it does not matter what subject, if 
any, has that experience. 
QUESTION 11: Which is more basic, the desire that I continue to live, function, or exist 
indefinitely, or the desire that this consciousness I enjoy continue indefinitely? 
Let us perform several thought experiments. 
B) My conscious life comes to an end, but I continue to exist in that I continue to live 
and function, as a zombie. The question is this: Is this what I desire? 
Answer: No, and surely it is not what most people desire. But this suggests that the de-
sire that I continue to live indefinitely is not basic. 
C) Given that it is possible in principle that an experience might occur that is not the 
experience of any subject, it is possible in principle that my conscious life-that which I 
call my conscious life, quite correctly, as things stand -might survive the subject I am 
now, for my conscious life is one thing, viz., a series of physical events of a certain con-
figuration, and the subject I am now is quite another, viz., a functioning human body. 
Imagine, then, that my body disappears while the series of physical events that consti· 
tutes my conscious life continues in the void indefinitely. There is no longer any subject 
of experience. There is only a series of conscious events, without a subject. The question 
is this: Is this what I desire? 
Answer: Yes, I think that it is, basically. "All this" -that which I call my conscious life 
-continues indefinitely. The fact that no body remains. and hence no subject, is perhaps 
no more than a minor cause for regret, if indeed it is a cause for regret at all. 
Note that my agency, my ability to influence the course of events in the world at large, 
is not necessarily diminished, for that which was my conscious life consists in physical 
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events which can, of course, cause further physical events, and it continues and might 
reasonably be identified as me. I have disappeared as a subject, but not necessarily as an 
agent. 
This thought experiment corresponds to the notion that the soul survives the demise of 
the body: the body disappears but the conscious life continues. Those who subscribe to 
this notion, however, fail to notice that when the body drops out of the picture, the sub-
ject drops out, too. 
D) I receive an offer: "You will not age and die in the usual way. Instead the following 
will happen: Tl1e objective I subjective dichotomy will be erased from your brain and 
hence from your conceptual scheme. Within your revised and somewhat diminished con-
ceptual scheme, then, there will be no such thing as 'I,' no such thing as 'my experience,' 
and for that matter, no such thing as 'an experience' at alL That is to say, you will not 
conceive of anything as yourself, your experience, or an experience. In compensation, 
you will be granted indefinitely long life of a highly enjoyable and increasingly splendid 
sort. Your experience, then, will be very positive and as long as you choose, but you will 
not have the conceptual resources requisite to label it 'my experience.'" The question is 
this: Would I do well to accept this offer? Does it satisfy my desire for unlimited life? Or 
does the loss of the concept of myself nullify the gift of unlimited life? 
Answer: I think that I would accept the offer, for that which is on offer is increasingly 
splendid experience of a type somewhat different from that to which I am accustomed. 
My conscious life-that which I call my conscious life within my present conceptual 
scheme-continues and becomes considerably more enjoyable. It is to be expected that in 
some ways the loss of the concept of myself will in itself make my experience more en-
joyable and hence of more intrinsic value, if less functionaL But this suggests that the ba-
sic desire is that "all this"-that which I call my conscious life-should continue. 
This last thought experiment suggests a line of thought which perhaps merits consid-
eration: "All this" is simply positive experience. But positive experience does, presum-
ably, continue indefinitely, probably throughout the universe. So the fact that I will cease 
to exist is no occasion for regret. 
Here is a further argument: 
What is the relation between this particular subject, the one I refer to as "I," and this 
conscious life, which I call "my conscious life"? 
This subject is a functioning human body, the one I refer to as "my body." The ques· 
tion, then, is this: What is the relation between this functioning body and this conscious 
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life? I can think of two things to say: (1) I perceive this body. I see the hands and feel 
movement in the joints, for instance. And (2) the content of this conscious life depends on 
the structure and dynamics of the brain that forms part of this body. 
This subject is one thing, viz., this functioning body, and this conscious life is another, 
viz., neural activity in the brain that forms part of this functioning body-which, how-
ever, might in principle continue in another form. I want to know whether it is the for-
mer or the latter that concerns me at bottom. 
Do I yearn, then, to continue to perceive this body indefinitely? No, I do not. It has con-
genitally weak abdominal muscles and in consequence a protruding stomach, it is slowly 
losing its top hair, the movement of its joints is not entirely comfortable, it fails to digest 
many foods correctly and in consequence generates all the discomfort of major food al-
lergy, and so on. When I wake up tomorrow morning, if by a miracle that portion of my 
conscious life which consists in perception of my body is altered greatly for the better in 
that my body is greatly improved, even to the extent that it is a new, different, body, I 
(the subject I am then) will feel gratified, not thwarted. Many, indeed, failing to think 
through the consequences, want to do without a body altogether and thus dispense with 
this aspect of human experience. 
Do I yearn, then, for some guarantee that the content of this conscious life will con-
tinue to depend on the structure and dynamics of this brain, the one currently in this 
skull? No, I do not. When I wake up tomorrow morning, if by a miracle my powers of 
thought and enjoyment have improved greatly in that the brain in this skull has been 
greatly upgraded, even to the extent that it is a new, different brain, I (the subject I am 
then) will feel gratified, not thwarted. 
Suppose that a new, quite different brain, far better and more powerful than the one I 
have now, is installed in this skull, but with memories sufficient to preserve my identity. 
In this case, at any rate, I will be glad to have it. 
In sum, it would appear correct to conclude that the basic desire is not that I continue 
to live, function, or exist indefinitely, but rather that "all this," the consciousness I enjoy, 
continue indefinitely. 
QUESTION 12: Does a human being survive teleportation? 
Teleportation is a thought experiment. 
E) An elite team at MIT invents a teleportation system and puts it to use successfully. 
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A device scans a functioning human body-Dr. Fernmann, a member of the team, has 
volunteered -encodes full information as to its structure and current dynamics, and va-
porizes it instantly and painlessly. The information is sent electromagnetically to a re-
ceiver at a remote location, and a device there constructs a body precisely similar to the 
one just destroyed. The question is this: Has Dr. Fernmann been sent to a new location, 
or is it rather that he has been destroyed and another human being created? 
Answer: The received opinion, I think, is that Dr. Fernmann has been sent to a new lo-
cation. I agree. The identity of the functioning human body, and hence of the human be-
ing, and hence also of the subject, does not depend on the identity of the materials of 
which it consists. In the actual case, for that matter, a functioning human body consists 
of ever-new materials. The rule is not "same materials, same body," but rather "continu-
ous structure and dynamics, same body." 
QUESTION 13: Suppose that functioning body A is vaporized in a flash and functioning 
body B constructed at that instant. If it is to be the case that B = A (that B is numerically 
identical to A), is it necessary that there be a causal connection between A and B? 
Let us perform another thought experiment. 
F) A meteorite vaporizes me. At precisely that instant, technicians testing teleporter 
receiving equipment at far-off MIT construct a functioning human body. Entirely by 
chance, that body happens to be precisely like mine down to the molecular level, which is 
to say precisely like me, immediately before I disappeared at the site of the meteorite im-
pact. The question is this: Have I died, or have I made a very lucky escape? 
Answer: I think that I have made a very lucky escape-very, very lucky. Surely, it is 
not the way in which the new body comes to be, but rather the fact that it is just like the 
old one, that is relevant. 
QUESTION 14: Is it possible for a human being to be in two places at once? 
Let us think again in terms of teleportation. 
G) A teleporter system scans Jones but leaves him unscathed, and reconstructs him at a 
remote location. The question is this: Are there two human beings now, Jones A and 
Jones B, or is Jones, one human being, in two places at once? 
I am inclined to say that immediately upon reconstruction, Jones is in two places at 
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once. Even if a question of responsibility arises, there is no reason to distinguish between 
Jones in the one place and Jones in the other. Since the two environments are different, 
however, the two functioning bodies will gradually become two different human beings in 
that the two functioning bodies will gradually become more and more different. If this is 
so, however, then similarity is the relevant criterion of identity. 
It might perhaps be correct to describe the case this way: immediately upon recon-
struction, Jones is one human being with a double body. 
QUESTION 15: Assuming that my conscious life is positive, is the prospect that it will 
end necessarily negative? 
The following thought experiment is my favorite. 
H) Just as I turn sixty, a child is born. The child will grow to be a fine young man (or 
woman) of twenty-four. At that age, he will be better looking, more highly skilled so-
cially, more intelligent, and more capable of pleasure than I ever was. But he will not be 
I, for everything about him, including his personality, will be significantly different. As 
he turns twenty-three, then, I will turn eighty-three. In the course of the following year, 
however, my functioning body, including my brain, will steadily metamorphose into the 
exact double of that of the young man. Gradually but steadily, I will lose my own memo-
ries and sense of self as my body changes in many ways, all for the better, and acquire 
the memories and sense of self of the young man. I will not be troubled by problems of 
memory or identity because those around me will understand what is happening and 
make allowances. At the end of the year, as I turn eighty-four and he twenty-four, my 
functioning body-the functioning body of the human being I will be then-and his func-
tioning body will be precisely similar down to the molecular leveL At the very instant 
this happens, however, his functioning body will be vaporized instantly and painlessly. 
Setting the fate of the young man aside, there are several questions: Does my existence 
come to an end? Does my conscious life come to an end? Do I face a negative prospect at 
the outset? 
Answers: 
My existence does come to an end, gradually, through the course of my eighty-fourth 
year. It is the configuration of my functioning body that determines what human being 
and hence what subject I am, and that defining configuration ceases to be. 
My conscious life does come to an end, for my existence comes to an end. I cease to be, 
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and my conscious life with me. 
I do not think, however, that I face a negative prospect at the outset. What is there to 
fear in it? Nothing. And what is there to regret? I might feel a bit sad at the thought that 
the human being I am will cease to exist in twenty-four years, but that would happen in 
any case. There is nothing greatly to be regretted, for experience continues and becomes 
more fulfilling and enjoyable. 
This invites a further question: Is there any parallel between this hypothetical case and 
the actual case? 
Answer: In the hypothetical case, the outcome is that I no longer exist and a fine 
young man exists in my place, as it were. But this is the outcome in the actual case, too. 
There is indeed a parallel, then. 
Some, I suspect, will feel that there is a crucial difference between the hypothetical 
case and the actual one in that in the former case the transition from the old man's con-
scious life to the young man's is gradual and continuous whereas in the latter it is not. I 
doubt, however, that this difference is indeed cruciaL For all that the transition takes a 
different form in the two cases, the outcome is the same. 
This in turn invites a further question: Why is it that the hypothetical case appears ac· 
ceptable whereas the actual case does not? 
Answer: In the hypothetical case, it is impossible to imagine that darkness follows the 
subject's end, and the transition to the young man's experience is continuous and gradual. 
I cannot think of any further reason. 
This is, perhaps, a significant result. In the hypothetical case the prospect is acceptable, 
even inviting, but in the actual case the outcome is the same. 
QUESTION 16: What determines the intrinsic value of an experience? 
A thought experiment: 
1) Imagine that you have a device which can generate physical events that constitute 
experiences. It can project them into the void or into a brain of appropriate structure. 
Generate a physical event that constitutes a whiff of rose. First project it into the void in 
the middle of a room. Then project it into Orville's brain. Now Orville is in a position to 
register it-that very physical event as opposed to information about it. He might re-
mark, "Smells good!" Finally, project it into Wilbur's brain. Now Wilbur is in a position 
to register it. He might remark, "What a wonderful fragrance!" The question is this: 
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Does the intrinsic value of the event vary through this procedure? Is it more valuable 
when it occurs in Orville's brain than when it occurs in the void? Is it more valuable 
when it occurs in Wilbur's brain than when it occurs in Orville's? 
Answer: I am inclined to say that the intrinsic value of the event does not vary. When 
it occurs in Orville's brain, Orville is in a position to register it in introspection, and 
when in Wilbur's brain, Wilbur is in a position to register it. When it occurs in the void, 
no one is in a position to register it-except, perhaps, by means of specialized devices not 
yet invented. But it is the same event and has the same intrinsic value in all three cases. 
This suggests, once again. that the subject is not to the point. An experience has what-
ever intrinsic value it does independently of identity of the subject -if indeed there is a 
subject. 
I conclude, then, that it is the configuration of the physical event that constitutes an 
experience, and that alone, which determines its intrinsic value. 
QUESTION 17: The intrinsic value of a neural event that has intrinsic value is evident 
only to the subject, who registers it in introspection but does not perceive it, not to the 
observer, who perceives it on the screen of a brain monitor but does not register it. Why 
is this so? 
The truth, perhaps, is that the observer does not feel the intrinsic value of a neural event 
that has intrinsic value, but nevertheless perceives that property in virtue of which it is 
intrinsically valuable. 
QUESTION 18: Is it accurate to say that a neural event which constitutes a positive ex-
perience is of intrinsic value only for the subject? 
This question presupposes that the neural event, which is to say the experience, is of in-
trinsic value for the subject. I am inclined to say that this presupposition is false, on the 
grounds that the experience is of intrinsic value simpliciter, not for this or that subject. 
I suspect, then, that it makes no sense to say that a particular experience is of intrinsic 
value for one subject but not for another. It is of intrinsic value whether it occurs in this 
subject, that subject, or no subject at all. 
To say that a particular of any type has intrinsic value is to say that it is valuable in 
itself, not in this or that respect. Its value is absolute, not relative. It smacks of inconsis-
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tency, then, to say that an experience has intrinsic value for one subject but not for an-
other. 
QUESTION 19: Does it make sense to conceive of two qualitatively identical experiences, 
had by two different subjects at two different times, as a single intermittently occurring 
state? If it does, then two subjects might in principle have one and the same experience 
at two different times. 
Let us pose this question in the form of a thought experiment. 
J) Amalfitano experiences a wonderful gust of sea breeze. Years later, Napolitano ex-
periences a wonderful gust of sea breeze. The two experiences are qualitatively identical 
-that is to say, just alike. The question is this: One might of course conceive of these 
two experiences as two distinct events, in the everyday, nontechnical sense in which an 
event is simply something that happens. But does it make sense to conceive of them as a 
single intermittently occurring state? 
Answer: As far as I can see, there is no objection to conceiving of them as a single in-
termittently occurring state. 
QUESTION 20: Is positive experience additive in the sense that a positive experience in 
one subject and another in another subject add up to an array of greater total intrinsic 
value than either positive experience alone? 
Again, let us perform a thought experiment. 
K) Let Wo be a subjectless momentary sensation-specifically, an exquisite whiff of 
rose. Let UI be a universe as large and old as the one we inhabit, in which, however, Wo 
is the only event of intrinsic value. Let WI ... Wn be a great number of sensations pre-
cisely similar to Woo And let U2 be a universe as large and old as the one we inhabit, in 
which, however, WI ... Wn are the only events of intrinsic value. The question is this: 
Does it make sense to create U2 in preference to UI? 
Answer: I am inclined to say that it does make sense. If I enter UI and position Wo 
within my brain, so that it becomes my experience, I can register Wo in introspection and 
intuit its intrinsic value. I know what it is like to have that experience, and I know that 
it is good, and how good, at least roughly. If I proceed from UI to Uz and position WI ... 
W3, for instance, within my brain simultaneously, then, presumably, I can intuit their 
130 
joint intrinsic value. But this, presumably, is greater. 
But this question is difficult and I am not entirely confident that this conclusion is cor· 
rect I am not even confident that I have posed the question correctly. 
QUESTION 21: Is it necessary to reflect on an experience in order to enjoy it? 
Let us perform a simple thought experiment. 
L) An alligator suns itself. Presumably, it lacks sufficient intellectual capacity to reo 
fleet on the experience, as a human being might. The question is this: Does the alligator 
enjoy the experience even though it has no capacity to reflect on it? 
Answer: Presumably, the alligator remains in the sun because it feels good to do so. It 
does not recognize itself as an entity, does not know that it exists, much less that it is an 
exothermic animal, and does not reason that it must take advantage of an external heat 
source in order to warm its blood. Of course it enjoys the experience, assuming that it is 
a conscious subject-which, to me, appears a safe assumption. In a human being, the 
pleasure of reflection constitutes additional pleasure. 
QUESTION 22: From the point of view of a third-person observer, does the transition 
from one subject, the predecessor, to another, the successor, entail any loss in terms of 
intrinsic value? 
Again, a thought experiment: 
M) Neural activity of the type that constitutes consciousness ceases in the brain of an 
old man. At that very instant, however, it commences in the developing brain of a fetus. 
The question is this: From the point of view of a third-person observer, has there been 
any loss in terms of intrinsic value? 
Answer: The neural activity which commences in the fetus's brain is just as worthy of 
being valued as that which ceases in the old man's brain. That is to say, the fetus's con-
sciousness has as much intrinsic value as the old man's. It would appear, then, that from 
the third-person point of view nothing has been lost. Consciousness was there, in that 
brain, and now it is here, in this brain, and there is no reason to bemoan this change of 
venue. If this is correct, then, once again, the subject is not to the point. 
There is, however, a wrinkle, in that the intrinsic value of an experience is not evident 
to a third-person observer. It is necessary to assume that she already knows, before she 
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proceeds to observe, that a physical event of such-and-such a description is of so much 
intrinsic value. Perhaps, then, this thought experiment ought to posit not a third· person 
observer with a point of view, but rather a third·person judge who registers the con-
sciousness of the old man and the fetus respectively, essentially in the way a subject reg-
isters his own experience in introspection. In principle, it should be possible to construct 
the necessary devices, or at least to duplicate the relevant neural activity in the brain of 
the third· person judge. 
QUESTION 23: Does the subject enjoy the benefit of a positive experience? 
The subject might well enjoy a benefit in a practical sense, in that he is better able to 
survive and reproduce because he has the experience. But this is beside the point. The 
answer, I think, is no. The subject has the experience and it is good, but he does not en· 
joy any benefit. It is not that the experience yields him something good. Rather, the expe· 
rience is good, whether it is his, another's, or no one's. 
If this is so, it is, perhaps, significant. For it appears to entail that the subject cannot 
legitimately complain of losing benefits at the time of death. He does not lose the benefit 
of positive consciousness because he never had any benefit from it. Rather, positive con· 
sciousness itself is good, and that continues-provided, of course, that there is a succes· 
sor. 
QUESTION 24: I know that someone else will enjoy life when I am gone. But this fails 
to satisfy me. My attitude is: "Very nice, but I want to enjoy life myself!" Am I justified 
in feeling this way? 
I doubt it. If it does not matter who enjoys, then it does not matter whether it is I who 
enjoys. 
Perhaps this in itself is an adequate response to the problem of mortality. It does not 
matter who will enjoy life in the future. Hence, if you think that it matters whether it is 
you or someone else, you are simply mistaken. 
To answer in more detail, I can think of three relevant dimensions: true / false, signifi· 
cant / trivial, and meaningful/nonsensical. The complaint that I will not enjoy, then, 
might be true and significant, true but trivial, false, or nonsensical. Which is it, then? 
This, of course, determines the correct response. 
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Those who say that one must accept inevitable death bravely take the complaint that I 
will not enjoy to be true and significant, as do those who advocate the development of 
bioengineering techniques to put an end to aging. Those who say that the body will be 
resurrected or that the soul survives the demise of the body deny that it is true. Those 
who say that the "I," the self, does not exist, are perhaps committed to the conclusion 
that it is nonsense. And so on. 
Obviously, if we premiss everyday criteria of personal identity, it is true that I who 
write this will not enjoy the splendid twenty·third century (the century of Star Trek). 
There might, however, be a more appropriate criterion, and it might yield a different 
outcome. It might indeed be false, then, that I will not enjoy. 
If the subject is not to the point-that is, if an experience has whatever intrinsic value 
it does regardless of the identity of the subject-then, even if it is true that I will not en· 
joy the splendid twenty-third century, that is a matter of no consequence. In this case, the 
complaint that I will not enjoy is true but trivial. 
QUESTION 25: \\-'bat explains the subject's remarkable concern with himself? 
I can register my own experience but not that of others, for the neural events that consti-
tute the former occur in my brain whereas those that constitute the latter do not. In con-
sequence, I can intuit the intrinsic value of my own experience but cannot intuit that of 
the experience of others, though I can reason to the conclusion that the experience of 
others is of intrinsic value. Possibly, the feeling that I am justified in my desire to enjoy 
the splendid twenty-third century for myself stems from this circumstance. It is one thing 
to experience a thrill of pleasure and think, "This is splendid!" and quite another to con-
ceive that someone else does so. 
QUESTION 26: Is it sounder to argue, "I miss out after I die because I am not there to 
enjoy," or rather, "I do not miss out after I die, because I am not there to miss out"? 
I suspect that the latter argument is sounder. 
QUESTION 27: I might well think, "People in the future will feel pleasure, but that 
pleasure means nothing to me, however fine it might be, because I will not feel it my-
self." At first sight, this sentiment appears contemptibly selfish. Is it truly so? 
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If the pleasure that people will feel in the future means nothing to me because I will 
not feel it myself, then the pleasure that other people feel now means nothing to me. But 
that is clearly pathological. 
QUESTION 28: I want to see what will happen in the next few centuries. But why is it 
so important to me that I be the one who sees? 
Compare this case with another. I want to be the one who gets the girl (and she wants to 
be the one who gets the best man). Perhaps a primeval selfishness operates here. 
QUESTION 29: I will not be an agent in the twenty-third century. 1 do not much regret 
this, because I do not think much of myself as an agent. Whatever I can do, others can 
do equally well or better-especially the ultracapable others of the distant future. I will 
not be a subject in the twenty-third century, either. Why, then, do I not think in the same 
way about this? 
Indeed, it appears to make good sense to think in the same way about my agency and my 
subjectivity. With any luck, the subjects of the distant future will be far more competent, 
both in terms of intellectual capacity and in terms of pleasure, than those of today. 
QUESTION 30: Is it truly a tragedy that a mouse alive today will not survive long as a 
subject? 
I am inclined to say no-with most people, I suspect But it might well prove to be the 
case that I compare to a subject of the distant future as a mouse compares to me. 
QUESTION 31: Does a human being survive in another who lives later? 
Let us perform a thought experiment. 
N) Again, neural activity of the type that constitutes consciousness ceases in the brain 
of an old man and at that very instant commences in the brain of a fetus. But there is an 
additional factor in that the fetus is precisely similar to-molecule-for-molecule just like 
-the old man as he was at the same interval of time from his own conception. The ques-
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tion is this: Does it make sense to say that the old man has reappeared, though in differ-
ent circumstances? 
It might be more conventional to put this question in terms of the moment of birth. Is 
the newborn baby the old man reborn? In the present context, however, it is not the mo-
ment of birth but rather the moment of the onset of consciousness that is significant. 
Answer: I think that it does make sense to say that the fetus is the old man as he was. 
Consider the teleportation of Dr. Fernmann once more. The functioning body constructed 
at the remote location is Dr. Fernmann in that it is just like the functioning body that 
constituted Dr. Fernmann at the moment he was scanned. By parity of reasoning, the fe-
tus is the old man as he was in that the functioning body that constitutes the fetus is just 
like the one that constituted the old man as a fetus. 
If the fetus is the old man starting life again, though a different life, this is perhaps of 
considerable significance. For it is safe to say that in the actual case, at the moment a 
person dies, or fairly soon before or afterwards, a fetus remarkably like the fetus that 
person was experiences the first flickerings of consciousness. 
In sum, then, let me outline my position, most tentatively: 
The popular notion that everyday consciousness gives way to darkness on the de-
mise of the body is false. 
Hence it is irrational to fear the state of death. 
A given experience has whatever intrinsic value it does independently of the identity 
of the subject. 
That which is desirable, then-whether desired or not-is not that I should continue 
to enjoy positive consciousness indefinitely, but rather that positive consciousness should 
continue indefinitely_ 
Perhaps this is what people do in fact desire at bottom, though they express their de-
sire by saying, "I want to live eternally." 
There is an additional, if subsidiary, consideration, in that it is not clear that a suc-
cessor similar to a predecessor is a numerically diverse subject by the appropriate crite-
rion of subject identity. 
-135-
(0-,""1--,, • '7 'J? ~w.f~*)[~.f4) 
2002if:lOJ=l16 B ~JJ. 
